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 THE DISTRACTION THAT IS STAND YOUR GROUND 
Katryna Santa Cruz* 
ABSTRACT 
Many critics of stand your ground law are motivated by the inaccurate 
belief that it gives Floridians a license to kill and a get-out-of-jail-free card 
before trial ever begins. This is a severe misinterpretation of Florida law. 
Stand your ground does not allow a person to kill anyone who makes him 
feel threatened, and it certainly does not grant defendants immunity from 
criminal prosecution based solely on their subjective fear of the victim. 
However, there still exists an aspect of stand your ground that is in obvious 
need of critical review and reform: self-defense jury instructions. This 
comment proposes that to function effectively and justly, Florida jurors 
acting as decision-makers in criminal trials must be reminded that they 
inadvertently operate with subconscious bias, and more importantly, that 
those biases have no place in the courtroom or in their verdict. Accordingly, 
in self-defense cases where race is at the heart of the issue, courts should 
refrain from using a color-blind approach—by banning discussions of race 
from the courtroom—and, instead, should adopt model jury instructions that 
explicitly prohibit race from being a part of the factual determination that the 
use of deadly force in self-defense was or was not reasonable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘Stand your ground’ has become a get-out-of-jail-free license to kill.”1 
“[Stand your ground] is being used by vigilantes to turn themselves into 
judge, jury and executioner.”2 “Stand your ground law[s] [sit] side-by-side 
with racial profiling; the ticket to vigilante justice.”3 “[Stand your ground] 
creates, in warped and perverse ways, numerous incentives for people in 
Florida to act, not only violently but lethally.”4 The phrase “stand your 
ground” has become a stamp in every modern conversation about self-
defense. When George Zimmerman shot and killed Trayvon Martin in 2012, 
Florida’s stand your ground statute became the despised centerpiece of a 
national conversation about the correlation between a white shooter’s use of 
self-defense against a black victim and the race relations between the two.5 
Six years after Zimmerman was acquitted on all counts, Michael Drejka shot 
and killed Markeis McGlockton in an act of so-called self-defense, and stand 
your ground has once again been thrust into a national debate about deadly 
force and racial prejudice.6 
Critics of stand your ground are rightfully concerned in two major 
respects: (1) “weakening the punitive consequences of using [deadly] force 
may serve to escalate aggressive encounters” and (2) “these laws may 
exacerbate racial disparities in homicide where threats motivated by racial 
 
1 Benjamin Crump, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Has Become a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free License to Kill, 
USA TODAY (July 30, 2018, 9:33 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2018/07/30/stand-your-ground-florida-
markeis-mcglockton-shooting-policing-usa/866902002/. 
2 Andrew Gillum (@AndrewGillum), TWITTER (July 30, 2018, 11:12 AM), 
https://twitter.com/AndrewGillum/status/1023994640297541633. 
3 A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 
(2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/SYG_Report_Book.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
4 Edward L. Queen, Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Incentivizes Violence. Markeis 
McGlockton’s Death Proves It, NBC NEWS: THINK (July 25, 2018, 4:34 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/florida-s-stand-your-ground-law-incentivizes-violence-
markeis-mcglockton-ncna894356. 
5 See Jay Livingston, How the Zimmerman/Martin Case Hurt Race Relations in the United States, 
PAC. STANDARD (July 26, 2013), https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-the-zimmermanmartin-case-hurt-
race-relations-in-the-united-states-63435. 
6 Michael Drejka was sentenced to twenty years in prison for manslaughter just a few days before 
this comment was finalized. Thus, this comment does not consider how the criticisms raised herein were 
(or were not) reflected in Drejka’s trial. In any case, Judge Bulone, presiding over Drejka’s trial, stated, 
as expected, that the “jury found that the defendant did not act reasonably responsibly[.]” See Heather 
Murphy, Florida Man Sentenced to 20 Years in Deadly Parking Confrontation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/10/us/florida-michael-drejka-sentence.html. Associate State 
Attorney Fred Schaub “called the 20-year sentence ‘appropriate[]’” and “never thought Stand Your 
Ground truly applied in this case[.]” Id. 
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stereotypes produce unnecessary fatalities.”7 These criticisms are warranted 
and undisputed by this comment.  
However, many other critics of stand your ground—particularly those 
that protested in the wake of the Zimmerman verdict—inaccurately believe 
that stand your ground gives Floridians a license to kill and a get-out-of-jail-
free card at the end of trial.8 This is a severe misinterpretation of Florida law.9 
Stand your ground does not allow a person to kill anyone who makes him 
feel threatened, and it certainly does not grant defendants immunity from 
criminal prosecution based solely on their subjective fear of the victim. While 
tragedies happen (and will always happen) even under a good set of long and 
well-established rules, the discussion below demonstrates the foundation of 
reason that historically underlies stand your ground. Further, the various 
exceptions to the retreat rule demonstrate the insignificance of the role of the 
affirmative duty to retreat in the face of deadly confrontations.  
Nevertheless, there still exists an aspect of stand your ground that is in 
obvious need of critical review and reform. A mountain of empirical evidence 
has revealed,10 unsurprisingly, “that jurors, particularly white jurors 
considering African Americans and other nonwhites [as defendants or 
victims], bring to their roles [as jurors] unconscious mental associations that 
may prejudice deliberations.”11 In fact, one study determined that “race was 
the most significant factor that determined whether a self-defense incident 
would be labeled as justified.”12 Even more alarming, “[a] larger national 
study found that in cases where whites killed blacks, the killing was 281 
percent more likely to be labeled as justified.”13 In Florida, therefore, it is 
imperative that courts begin to engage in the habit of “[r]eminding 
decisionmakers of their personal beliefs, [in order to] help them to resist 
falling unconsciously into the discrimination habit.”14  
 
7 David K. Humphreys et al., Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Self-
Defense Law on Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted Time Series Study, 177 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 45, 45 (2017); see generally A.B.A., ADOPTED RESOLUTION 112, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2015mm_hodres/112.pdf (proposing to 
all legislative bodies and governmental agencies to refrain from enacting stand your ground laws and to 
repeal any existing ones). 
8 Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 111 (2015). 
9 Id. at 107 (“Why then, is Stand Your Ground so controversial at the moment? . . . [C]onfusion 
about the elements of self-defense law generally, and about the role and function of Retreat and Stand 
Your Ground rules in particular.”). 
10 See discussion infra Section III. 
11 Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: Stereotyping Media and Criminal 
Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 130 (2008). 
12 ABA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2 n.4 (emphasis added). 
13 Id. 
14 Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice 
Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 759–60 (1995). 
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Although cases such as State v. Zimmerman (and now, State v. Drejka) 
highlight the need for change, the true issue with stand your ground is not in 
the right to defend one’s self, nor is it in the absence of a duty to retreat; the 
true issue lies in courtroom procedure. The objective reasonableness standard 
is the crack through which justice falls. Of all the factors that a juror may take 
into consideration when determining whether a defendant’s use of deadly 
force in self-defense was reasonable, race should not be one of them. “Jurors 
are not experts in legal principles; to function effectively, and justly, they 
must be accurately instructed in the law.”15 This comment proposes that in 
order to function effectively and justly, Florida jurors must be reminded that 
they inadvertently operate with subconscious bias, and more importantly, that 
those biases have no place in the courtroom or in their verdict. Accordingly, 
in self-defense cases where race is at the heart of the issue, courts should 
refrain from using a color-blind approach—by banning discussions of race 
from the courtroom—and, instead, should adopt model jury instructions that 
explicitly prohibit race from being a part of the factual determination of 
whether deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. 
Section II of this comment will provide a background of self-defense 
law, generally. This section first draws on the various similarities between 
retreat and stand your ground laws, and then discusses both facets of stand 
your ground: substantive and procedural. By explaining the rationale 
underlying each facet, noting their respective criticisms, and then responding 
to those criticisms, this section will lead to the conclusion that stand your 
ground need not be overhauled. Substantively, stand your ground is founded 
on the desire to achieve clarity and fairness in the law and it achieves just 
that.  
Section III of this comment addresses the color-blind approach to self-
defense trials. In an effort to reduce bias in cases at which race is a core issue 
or to avoid overly sensationalized case themes that appeal to the public eye, 
courts often ban references to race during trial. This is a grave mistake. Rather 
than reduce racial bias, such subtle, under-the-rug references to race serve to 
magnify jurors’ subconscious racial bias. This section combines a multitude 
of psychosocial research which reveals that (a) color-blind trials lead to 
tainted verdicts and (b) subconscious bias is pervasive in everyday 
interactions between white and black persons—suggesting that such bias is 
not abandoned outside the courthouse doors. This section also uses People v. 
Goetz and State v. Zimmerman, two of the most controversial self-defense 
cases in American history, to better understand the failure of the color-blind 
approach.  
Section IV will conclude by recommending that the Supreme Court of 
Florida adopt new jury instructions that explicitly prohibit the use of race as 
 
15 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 302 (1981). 
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a physical characteristic (of either the defendant or the victim) in determining 
whether a defendant’s fear of the victim was reasonable. The subconscious 
racial biases that jurors inadvertently operate with leak into our criminal 
justice system and decay its aspirations of blind evenhandedness. Courts 
must stop ignoring the obvious truth about unintentional bias and 
acknowledge this problem head-on. Thus, the Court’s duty is to adopt jury 
instructions that forbid jurors from contemplating a defendant or victim’s 
race as a factor that plays into the reasonableness determination because to 
fail to do so would be to actively endorse racial prejudice. For every time a 
court turns a blind eye in cases at which race is at the heart of the issue 
between the defendant and the victim, our justice system takes a step 
backwards in our progress towards racial equality. 
This comment in no way attempts to soften the blow of stand your 
ground on race relations; the frequency with which white-on-black crime 
occurs is abhorrent and the amendment that places the burden of proof on the 
State at the pre-trial immunity hearing has placed an undeniable hurdle before 
the fairness that the criminal justice system aims for. However, a complete 
overhaul of stand your ground will not achieve the peace that the community 
seeks.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Pervasive misinterpretation of stand your ground has led to mass 
amounts of misguided public critique. By far, the biggest misconception of 
stand your ground is that defendants have a right to use deadly force only 
when they experience a subjective fear of their attacker.16 Other flawed 
criticisms attack the alleged ease with which the burden of proof at the pre-
 
16 See, e.g., Anonymous, Stand Your Ground Laws Are Bad for Society, GOSPEL POL., 
http://www.gospelpolitics.com/stand-your-ground-laws-are-bad-for-society.html (“Before [stand your 
ground], if the other guy blinked and you felt threatened by that, you would have had to step back away 
from him—now, you can just waste him. Legally.”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2019); Karl Etters, Protesters 
Press for Changes in Stand Your Ground Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 1:16 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/10/stand-your-ground-protesters/6257543/ (“‘It’s 
a flawed law because you don’t need an actual threat . . . [a]ll you’ve got to do is believe a threat and you 
can use deadly force.’”); Chris Persaud, Gun Murders Remain Higher 13 Years After Stand Your 
Ground—Especially in White Suburbs, FLA. BULLDOG (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.floridabulldog.org/2018/11/gun-murders-remain-high-13-years-after-stand-your-ground-
especially-in-white-suburbs/ (“Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ law effectively allows someone to kill an 
attacker as long as he can show he feared that he would be killed.”); Queen, supra note 4 (“Instead, the 
Florida statute now operates using the premise that an individual need only feel threatened to exercise 
deadly force. The bar for this claim remains low, requiring little adjudication or investigation.”); Allie 
Raffa, Fatal Shooting Reignites ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law Debate in Florida, FOX NEWS (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/fatal-shooting-reignites-stand-your-ground-law-debate-in-florida (“I think 
that you can have a self-defense statute—that’s great, but when everywhere becomes my castle—my castle 
is in the middle of a parking lot at Walmart or over a handicapped spot or over in the mall . . . you see the 
slippery slope that’s starting to occur?”). 
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trial immunity hearing prevents any possibility of justice.17 These arguments 
do not have a foundation in actual self-defense law.  
To lay out the premise of the recommendation that this comment 
proposes, this section highlights the many similarities between stand your 
ground and retreat statutes. With an understanding of the few differences 
between the two, critics of stand your ground will, hopefully, refocus their 
efforts on mending Florida’s flawed model jury instructions. 
A. The Law of Self-Defense 
There are two approaches to self-defense statutes: retreat and no 
retreat—i.e., stand your ground. The minority of states that have adopted the 
retreat approach require a defendant to retreat from a confrontation before 
using deadly force. If a defendant in a retreat jurisdiction uses deadly force 
without first attempting to retreat, he may not claim self-defense.18 The 
majority of states that have adopted stand your ground statutes do not require 
a defendant to retreat before using deadly force. A defendant in a stand your 
ground jurisdiction may still claim self-defense even if he could have safely 
retreated from the confrontation before using deadly force but failed to do 
so.19  
Despite their most obvious difference, both approaches to self-defense 
statutes arise out of the same essential elements: in order to have a self-
defense claim when a defendant has used deadly force against their alleged 
attacker, the defendant must (1) face a threat of death or serious bodily injury 
(2) which is imminent (3) and which the defendant honestly (subjectively) 
and (4) reasonably (objectively) believes renders necessary the use of deadly 
 
17 See, e.g., David Love, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Encourage Racially Charged Violence, CNN 
(Aug. 3, 2018, 10:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/03/opinions/stand-your-ground-law-racial-
violence-opinion-love/index.html (“[The 2017 Amendment] made it even easier for defendants to get off 
by shifting the burden of proof to the state. In other words, the state must prove that the shooter was not 
acting in self-defense.”); The Editorial Board, ‘Stand Your Ground’ Could Get Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/stand-your-ground-could-get-worse.html 
(“Under the proposed change, prosecutors would essentially have to try a case twice, at a hearing and then 
at the trial[.]”). 
18 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2019) (“[A] person is not justified in using deadly 
physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such 
force with complete safety (1) by retreating.”); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:3-4(b)(2) (2018) (“The use of deadly 
force is not justifiable [if] (b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with 
complete safety by retreating[.]”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (“The use of deadly force is not 
justifiable . . . if . . . the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete 
safety by retreating[.]”). 
19 As of 2014, 33 states have stand your ground laws: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. ABA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 10 n.7. 
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force in order to prevent such injury or death.20 Moreover, traditional self-
defense doctrine in both jurisdictions includes a proportionality requirement 
(the defendant may use only that amount of force which is not excessive in 
relation to the threatened force).21 
Beyond these basic elements, both approaches also embrace other 
common judicial and statutory corollaries. For example, both approaches are 
unavailable to a defendant who was the initial aggressor.22 However, the 
initial aggressor in either jurisdiction may possibly avail himself of self-
defense immunity because both jurisdictions justify deadly force used by the 
person who acted first, but later “[purged] himself of that status and 
[regained] the right of self-defense,”23 such as when the victim escalates the 
conflict. Both approaches embrace the “castle doctrine,” under which there is 
no duty to retreat when a defendant is attacked in his or her own home.24 
Moreover, both jurisdictions allow a defendant to use deadly force against an 
attacker who is committing a serious felony upon their person or property (as 
opposed to limiting the use of deadly force in the case of imminent death or 
serious bodily injury).25  
Finally, and most importantly, both approaches embrace the objective 
reasonableness standard for determining whether the defendant’s belief that 
he needed to use deadly force was justified: Was the defendant’s belief that 
the attacker was about to kill or seriously injure him reasonable? If so, deadly 
force may be used—in either jurisdiction. It should be noted that the answer 
to this question may not be based entirely on an objective reality (without 
noting how that particular defendant felt), nor may it be based entirely on the 
defendant’s subjective impressions (by only considering how that particular 
defendant felt)—it is more appropriately defined as a hybrid test:26  
The objective standard does not require the jury to ignore the 
defendant’s perceptions in determining 
 
20 See Ward, supra note 8, at 93–94. 
21 Stillwagon v. City of Del., 274 F. Supp. 3d 714, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (quotations omitted) 
(“Self-defense also involves a proportionality requirement: the accused is privileged to use that force 
which is reasonably necessary to repel the attack.”). 
22 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (2018) (“The justification described in the preceding sections 
of this chapter is not available to a person who . . . Initially provokes the use or threatened use of force 
against himself or herself[.]”). 
23 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 227 (7th ed. 2015). 
24 See Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 555 (1895) (“There is but one place where he need 
not retreat any further, where he need not go away from the danger, and that is in his dwelling-house.”). 
25 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5223 (2018) (justifying deadly force to prevent unlawful 
entry); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(1)(e) (2018) (justifying deadly force to prevent “any felony”); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (2018) (justifying deadly force to prevent “kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible 
criminal sexual act or robbery”); State v. Martinez, 230 P. 379, 384 (N.M. 1924) (justifying deadly force 
to prevent rape). 
26 DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 238. 
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the reasonableness of his or her conduct. In making that 
determination, the facts or circumstances must be taken as 
perceived by the defendant, even if they were not the true 
facts or circumstances, so long as a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position could also reasonably perceive the facts 
or circumstances in that way. If the fact or circumstance 
relied upon by the defendant to justify a belief of imminent 
danger or the need to use deadly force to meet that danger is 
so improbable that no reasonable person in the defendant’s 
position would perceive it to be the case, the jury cannot be 
directed to assume that fact or circumstance in judging 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, for that 
would skew the whole analysis of reasonableness.27 
Thus, “a person may only defend himself if he subjectively believes that 
deadly force is required and a reasonable person would also believe that it is 
appropriate under the circumstances.”28 Accordingly, jurors may consider all 
factors previously known to the defendant about his victim, as well as the 
factors that the defendant was faced with at the time he used deadly force. As 
discussed more fully in Section III, jurors in either jurisdiction may consider 
the “physical attributes of all persons involved, including the defendant” in 
determining whether the defendant’s fear of the victim was reasonable.29  
B. Stand Your Ground: The Substantive Facet 
The states that have enacted stand your ground statutes have adopted 
one, or both, facets of stand your ground: the substantive facet and/or the 
procedural facet—procedure is not adopted without substance, but substance 
may be adopted alone.30 The substantive facet offers defendants an 
affirmative defense to be used at trial against a charge of criminal homicide 
which, if argued successfully, results in an acquittal.31 The procedural facet, 
adopted by only a handful of states, offers defendants the right to a pre-trial 
 
27 State v. Marr, 765 A.2d 645, 652 (Md. 2001) (internal citations omitted). 
28 DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 238. 
29 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986). 
30 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C)-(D) (2018). 
31 In Mosansky v. State, the First District Court of Appeal explained the legal consequences of a 
successful affirmative defense: 
[Self-defense] is an affirmative defense that has the effect of legally excusing the defendant from an 
act that would otherwise be a criminal offense. The defendant has the burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence that he acted in self-defense in order to be entitled to a jury instruction on the issue. But 
the presentation of such evidence does not change the elements of the offense at issue; rather, it 
merely requires the state to present evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self-defense. 
33 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). 
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immunity hearing at which they may argue that they acted lawfully in self-
defense and, if argued successfully, grants them immunity from further 
criminal prosecution.32  
Focusing on the substantive facet of stand your ground, this section 
explains the sound policy considerations underlying Florida’s self-defense 
law, the minimal role of an affirmative duty to retreat, and the even more 
minimal role of stand your ground in George Zimmerman’s trial. In doing so, 
this section attempts to shift stand your ground critics’ attention away from 
the law’s substance and towards its application in jury instructions. 
1. The Rationales Underlying Stand Your Ground 
The substantive facet of stand your ground is a historical fixture of self-
defense law. In 1921, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized the no 
retreat rule as being “consistent with human nature”:  
[I]f a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger 
of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may 
stand his ground and that if he kills him he has not exceeded 
the bounds of lawful self-defense . . . Detached reflection 
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted 
knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition of 
immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider 
whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly 
with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.33 
For Justice Holmes, “Stand Your Ground was the right approach not just 
because it had in fact become widely accepted by many states, but also 
because it more accurately reflected the behavior and the capacities of human 
beings under the stress of imminent attack and possible death.”34 Thus, to 
impose a duty to retreat would be to ignore the realities about the “human 
capacity for rational deliberation under severe emotional distress.”35 This 
rationale also finds support in contemporary neuroscience, which suggests 
that “(1) the limbic system of the brain, which controls basic emotions 
 
32 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(d)(1) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2018); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-24.2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085 (West 
2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.2(e) (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.25(F) (2018); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-11-450 (2018). For a general overview of pre-trial immunity hearings and the similarities and 
differences among the states that offer them, see Benjamin M. Boylston, Immune Disorder: Uncertainty 
Regarding the Application of “Stand Your Ground” Laws, 20 BARRY L. REV. 25 (2014) (note: this was 
published three years before the 2017 amendment to Florida’s stand your ground statute discussed in 
Section II.C). 
33 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
34 Ward, supra note 8, at 104. 
35 Id. at 105. 
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including fear and anger, can overwhelm the rational faculties in times of 
great stress, and (2) such emotional flooding may drive an individual’s 
decisions in ways of which even the individual is unaware.”36 
For other stand your ground supporters, the rule ensures the most 
reasonable version of events. In 1876, the Ohio Supreme Court defended 
stand your ground not merely “to repel a mere trespass, or even to save life 
. . . but [because] a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from 
an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life 
or do him enormous bodily harm.”37 Thus, “the surest [way] to prevent the 
occurrence of occasions for taking life [is to let] the would-be robber, 
murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives are, in a measure, in 
the hands of their intended victims.”38  
Moreover, stand your ground supporters adopt the rule in an effort to 
achieve clarity in the law. Supporters note that (a) “it is often quite difficult 
for a jury to determine whether a person should reasonably believe that he 
may retreat from a violent attack in complete safety”; and (b) “a rule which 
requires a non-aggressor to retreat may confuse the jury and lead to 
inconsistent verdicts.”39 Thus, stand your ground “increases clarity because 
it obviates the need for the jury to inquire into the often-unanswerable 
question of whether a defender actually knew of a retreat option and knew 
that it was completely safe.”40 
Last, stand your ground supporters agree that the rule protects more 
innocent defenders than the retreat rule. “A duty of retreat forces an innocent 
defender, in the moment of being attacked, to assess his options for escape 
and to act on those options if possible, before responding with deadly 
force.”41 Considering how much time an innocent defender may waste in 
making that assessment—particularly in a situation in which every second 
that passes may be the defining moment between life and death—the duty to 
retreat favors the life of an unlawful aggressor over that of an innocent 
defender.42 If faced with a Hobson’s choice of choosing between the life of 
an innocent person and the life of an unlawful aggressor, “the law should side 
with the former and not the latter.”43 
 
36 Id. 
37 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876). 
38 Id. at 200. 
39 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990). 
40 Ward, supra note 8, at 107. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.; see ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 78 (5th ed. 2009) (“The rationale 
for the . . . ‘no retreat’ rule is that a person should not be required to resort to what some might deem 
cowardice in order to spare the life of the one who precipitated the difficulty in the first place.”). 
43 Ward, supra note 8, at 107. 
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2. The Non-Existent Role of Stand Your Ground in State v. 
Zimmerman 
As much as stand your ground’s critics may want a complete overhaul 
of Florida’s self-defense law, a retreat statute will simply not deter gun 
violence by those who want to engage in it.44 The hotly debated Zimmerman 
trial helps illustrate why the demand for an affirmative duty to retreat is 
misguided. In 2012, self-appointed neighborhood watchman George 
Zimmerman shot and killed seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin after he 
noticed Trayvon in a Central Florida residential neighborhood.45 On a call to 
911, the dispatcher instructed Zimmerman to cease from following 
Trayvon.46 Despite that instruction, Zimmerman continued to follow 
Trayvon, eventually confronting him and engaging in a physical altercation 
with him. Sometime during the altercation, Zimmerman shot and killed 
Trayvon, later claiming self-defense at trial. Although it is undisputed that 
Zimmerman initiated the confrontation, it is unclear from the facts whether 
Trayvon somehow escalated the altercation47 (thus justifying Zimmerman’s 
use of deadly force), or, whether Zimmerman used deadly force without 
actually facing a deadly attack (thus constituting an unlawful use of deadly 
force).  
To better understand the minimal role of an affirmative duty to retreat, 
consider an exception to the retreat rule: defendants in a retreat jurisdiction 
do not have a duty to retreat unless they know they can retreat in complete 
safety.48 And even though the reasonable person might know that he could 
 
44 Philip Lentz, Goetz Confession Tells Intent to Kill, CHIC. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 1987), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-04-30-8702020166-story.html (“‘I know this sounds 
horrible,’ Bernhard Goetz said in a flat voice. ‘But my intention was to murder them, to hurt them, to 
make them suffer as much as possible.’”). 
45 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Facts in the Zimmerman Trial, THE NEW YORKER (July 16, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-facts-in-the-zimmerman-trial. 
46 See Cjetboy, George Zimmerman 911 Call About Trayvon Martin Unredacted, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
20, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9A-gp8mrdw (“Dispatcher: ‘Are you following him?’ 
Zimmerman: ‘Yeah.’ Dispatcher: ‘OK, we don’t need you to do that.’”). 
47  Partially corroborated by Zimmerman’s wounds on the back of his head, allegedly received 
when Trayvon was on top of him and repeatedly slammed Zimmerman’s head into the pavement. See 
Lizette Alvarez, Martin Was Shot as He Leaned over Zimmerman, Court Is Told, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/us/teenager-was-over-zimmerman-as-he-was-shot-expert-
says.html. 
48 Ward, supra note 8, at 110 (“If a safe retreat is not possible, and the other elements of self-
defense are present, a defendant may stand his or her ground and respond with force, including deadly 
force, if the defendant reasonably fears for his or her life.”); see also Hoong v. Lopez, No. 2:10-cv-01247-
JKS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144087, at *32–33 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012) (“An aggressor or a mutual 
combatant must retreat and communicate withdrawal from the fight before being entitled to assert any 
form of self-defense; the exception is where a simple assault is met with deadly or other ‘excessive’ force 
that is too sudden to permit safe retreat and withdrawal, at which point the defendant may employ deadly 
force in self-defense.”). 
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have retreated in complete safety, the defendant would not be under a duty to 
retreat unless he subjectively knew that he could.49 This could result in 
situations where a defendant “stands his ground” knowing he could safely 
retreat but chooses not to do so and later claims (untruthfully) at trial that he 
did not know he could retreat in complete safety. This is no different from 
the kind of encounters that stand your ground statues spawn.  
For example—assuming the facts were unmistakably clear about the 
series of events that played out after Zimmerman confronted Trayvon—
consider how the trial would have played out in a retreat jurisdiction:  
• If Zimmerman was the first aggressor, but Trayvon 
escalated the altercation from using non-deadly force 
(e.g., knocks and blows that would have caused nothing 
more than bruising and bleeding) to using deadly force 
(e.g., knocks and blows that would have caused serious 
bodily injury or death), Zimmerman could have argued 
that he did not know that he could have retreated in 
complete safety. Zimmerman would have then been 
justified in his belief that he needed to use deadly force 
to avoid Trayvon using deadly force against him—
thereby relieving Zimmerman of his duty to retreat.50  
• Alternatively, if Trayvon did not escalate the altercation 
to the point of Zimmerman’s fear of a deadly attack but 
rather, Zimmerman faced a non-deadly attack, 
Zimmerman could have argued at trial that he had to 
defend himself by engaging in the altercation with non-
deadly force (i.e., fighting back). However, had Trayvon 
further escalated the attack, Zimmerman would be, once 
again, relieved of the duty to retreat before using deadly 
force.  
From a purely substantive standpoint, it is not clear that any legal issue 
in the Zimmerman case turned on the presence of Florida’s stand your ground 
statute.51 Duty to retreat or no duty to retreat, State v. Zimmerman may have 
resulted in the same exact acquittal, especially considering the trial’s other 
various failures.52 In other words, stand your ground is not the reason that the 
community is left feeling that justice for Trayvon Martin has not been served; 
 
49 See LOEWY, supra note 42, at 79. 
50 Ward, supra note 8, at 110 (“If [the facts about Zimmerman shooting Trayvon Martin out of 
fear for his life when Martin was on top of him were true], then regardless of what the law or the jury 
instructions said, Zimmerman had no opportunity to retreat—no choice but to stay where he was and 
defend himself.”). 
51 Id. at 109. 
52 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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the true mistake in the Zimmerman trial lies in the fact that the jurors were 
not read the instructions on Manslaughter.  
The model jury instructions for Manslaughter state that a defendant is 
guilty if his culpable negligence caused the victim’s death.53 To determine 
culpable negligence, jurors may consider the pattern of conduct that preceded 
the altercation and use of deadly force.54 Had they been so instructed, the 911 
call on which the dispatcher explicitly instructed Zimmerman to cease from 
following Trayvon would have helped the State get a charge of Manslaughter 
that is not so easily disposed of with a self-defense theory.  
Instead, jurors were instructed on Second-Degree Murder, which only 
results in a conviction if the defendant’s acts evince a depraved mind 
regardless of human life, through a showing of “ill will, hatred, spite, or an 
evil intent, [that] is of such a nature that the act itself indicates an indifference 
to human life.”55 Only if the State proves all elements of a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt does the defendant put on a self-defense case.56 Despite 
Zimmerman’s indisputable recklessness in pursuing, confronting, and killing 
Trayvon Martin, the State did not have any evidence of evil intent that would 
have survived a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.57 Consequently, as a 
result of the State’s decision to try Zimmerman for Second-Degree Murder, 
rather than Manslaughter, and the State’s subsequent failure to meet the 
elements of Second-Degree Murder, Zimmerman was acquitted of all charges 
of homicide—without a need for Zimmerman to ever put on a self-defense 
case.58 Understanding the State’s lapse in judgment reveals the truth: stand 
your ground played little to no role in Zimmerman’s acquittal. Despite stand 
your ground’s critics’ well-intentioned efforts to highlight the unfortunate 
realities of race relations in Florida, the law’s role in State v. Zimmerman was 
more prevalent in the press than in the courtroom. 
 




55 FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.4: SECOND-DEGREE MURDER, 
https://jury.flcourts.org/criminal-jury-instructions-home/criminal-jury-instructions/sji-criminal-chapter-
7/. 
56 Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 341 (1993) (“States must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt with respect to every element of the offense charged, but [they] may place on defendants the burden 
of proving affirmative defenses.”). 
57 Ward, supra note 8, at 110 (“Proving its version of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt is, of 
course, the job of the prosecution seeking a conviction in every criminal case—not just those involving 
self-defense.”). 
58 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a) (“If, at the close of the evidence for the state or at the close of all the 
evidence in the cause, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction, 
it may, and on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or the defendant shall, enter a judgment of 
acquittal.”); Penton v. State, 548 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“It is axiomatic that the state 
has the burden of proving each of the various elements of the offense, and that it must, in order to avoid 
the entry of a judgment of acquittal, produce legally sufficient evidence of each element.”). 
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C. Stand Your Ground: The Procedural Facet59 
In jurisdictions that adopt the procedural facet of stand your ground, a 
person who is justified in using deadly force in an act of self-defense is 
immune from criminal prosecution, including arrest, detainment in custody, 
and being charged or prosecuted.60 Accordingly, defendants claiming self-
defense are entitled to a pre-trial immunity hearing “where the person’s 
substantive right to Stand Your Ground immunity is [determined] by the trial 
court.”61 Under current Florida law, once a prima facie claim of self-defense 
has been raised by the defendant at the pre-trial immunity hearing, the State 
carries the burden by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the self-
defense immunity.62 The statute that placed this burden of proof on the State 
was based on Chief Justice Canady’s dissent in Bretherick v. State.63 In his 
dissent, Chief Justice Canady recognized that, according to the text of the 
statute, the Florida Legislature clearly intended to grant defendants the 
benefit of stand your ground immunity: 
There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended 
for a defendant to be denied immunity and subjected to trial 
when that defendant would be entitled to acquittal at trial on 
the basis of a Stand Your Ground defense. But the majority’s 
decision here guarantees that certain defendants who would 
be entitled to acquittal at trial will nonetheless be deprived 
of immunity from trial.64 
The Florida Legislature expressed their agreement,65 and in 2017, they 
“changed the quantum of proof required from preponderance of the evidence 
previously required of the defendant to clear and convincing evidence now 
required of the state, after the defendant makes a prima facie claim of self-
 
59 Unfortunately, there is no opportunity to discuss State v. Zimmerman as it relates to the pre-trial 
immunity hearing because Zimmerman waived his right to it. It must be noted that this decision occurred 
in 2013, prior to the amendment that placed the burden on the State to disprove the defense. In such a 
close case, it was wiser for a defendant to waive his right to the hearing than to risk being unable to meet 
his burden. See Yamiche Alcindor, Zimmerman Waives Pre-trial Immunity Hearing, USA TODAY (Apr. 
30, 2013, 7:49 AM), https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/04/30/trayvon-martin-zimmerman-
self-defense-hearing/2122991/. 
60 FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2018). 
61 Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609, 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
62 FLA. STAT. § 776.032(4) (2018). 
63 FLA. S. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, CS/SB 128 (2017) STAFF ANALYSIS (2017) [hereinafter Bill 
Analysis Statement], http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/128/Analyses/2017s00128.rc.PDF. 
64 Bretherick v. State, 170 So. 3d 766, 780 (Fla. 2015) (Canady, J., dissenting). 
65 “The dissenting opinion in Bretherick, however, interpreted the existing substantive right to 
assert immunity and concluded that the state has the burden of proof. Consistent with the Bretherick 
dissent, the bill places the burden of proof on the state at pretrial immunity hearings.” Bill Analysis 
Statement, supra note 63, at 1. 
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defense immunity.”66 Not only did the amendment change the quantum of 
proof required to receive criminal immunity, but it also shifted the burden 
from the defendant to the State. This shift did not come without its 
criticisms.67  
In October of 2018, the League of Prosecutors, a Miami organization of 
current and former local prosecutors,68 filed a brief of amicus curiae on the 
issue of the constitutionality of section 776.032.69 Among their many 
criticisms, the League claims that the burden “unlawfully forces state 
attorneys to try cases involving self-defense claims before a judge, not a 
jury.”70 Critics of the 2017 amendment are concerned with the burden shift 
to the State, including the higher burden that accompanies the shift, the fact 
that “the pretrial immunity hearing is in fact a full-blown trial with the judge 
acting as the trier of fact,” and that stand your ground immunity is the “only 
legislatively created pretrial immunity statute for a criminal prosecution 
which requires the judge, as the fact finder, to determine whether the 
defendant has a legal excuse for committing the alleged criminal acts, 
essentially an affirmative defense . . . [which] has historically been the 
province of a jury.”71  
Although the League of Prosecutors—along with the amendment’s 
many other critics—makes valid arguments for wanting a defendant to carry 
his own burden at the pretrial stage, they fail to address the simple fact that 
at trial, the State has the ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was not justified in using deadly force. If the State 
 
66 Hight v. State, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 11122 at *7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
67 Noreen Marcus, ‘Stand Your Ground on Steroids’ Before Florida Supremes; Flood of Cases 
Could Be Reopened, FLA. BULLDOG (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.floridabulldog.org/2018/11/stand-
your-ground-on-steroids-before-florida-supremes-flood-of-cases-could-be-reopened/ (“[Miami-Dade 
State Attorney, Katherine Fernandez Rundle said,] [f]or us, it’s like putting on a whole trial before you 
have to put the trial on.’”). 
68 LEAGUE OF PROSECUTORS - FLORIDA, https://leagueofprosecutors.org (last visited Apr. 6, 
2019). 
69 Brief for League of Prosecutors - Florida as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Love 
v. State, 247 So. 3d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2018) (No. SC18-747), 2018 WL 5478954 [hereinafter Brief 
for League of Prosecutors - Florida]. 
70 David Ovalle, Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law Is Unconstitutional, Miami’s Top Prosecutor 
Tells High Court, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article220784125.html#storylink=cpy. 
71 Brief for League of Prosecutors - Florida, supra note 69, at *12; see also Brief for Giffords Law 
Center as Amicus Curiae to Prevent Gun Violence, Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2018) 
(No. SC18-747), 2018 WL 5635053 at *19 (“Shifting the burden to the State and raising the quantum of 
proof as contemplated by the 2017 Amendment will make it easier for defendants who are not entitled 
to Stand Your Ground immunity to avoid criminal prosecution, and may exacerbate the disparate impacts 
demonstrated under the law.”); Brief for University of Miami School of Law Federal Appellate Clinic as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Love v. State, 247 So. 3d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2018) (No. 
SC18-747), 2018 WL 5635054 at *22 (“The unconstitutional pre-trial hearing that the statute purports to 
authorize is nothing other than a way to short-circuit the judicial process. Any legitimate protection it 
affords is already provided by the availability of jury trials.”). 
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cannot prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was not 
justified in using deadly force at the pretrial immunity hearing where they 
have only one person to convince, they have no chance of defeating the claim 
at trial where they bear a much heavier burden72 and have six people to 
convince. Moreover, despite the amendment’s burden shift from the 
defendant to the State, defendants often waive their right to a pre-trial 
immunity hearing if they (and their defense attorney) doubt their ability to 
assert a successful self-defense claim—again eliminating the possibility that 
they will get a get-out-of-jail-free card before trial ever begins.73 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida has previously concluded that 
“the plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right 
to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.”74 
Therefore, the statutory immunity granted to defendants in the 2017 
amendment is a substantive right that the Legislature has a right to enact,75 
and a right that the Court cannot take away. Although this amendment aptly 
reveals the Florida Legislature’s controversial position on self-defense, it 
does very little to change the structure of criminal litigation.  
 
72 Professor Giannelli has best captured the difference between the “clear and convincing” and 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard: 
The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is an intermediate standard, requiring more 
convincing force than the “preponderance of evidence” standard but less than the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard. The term “highly probable” is as good as we can probably do in 
describing this standard. . . . The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is the most demanding 
standard and applies almost exclusively in criminal cases. 
PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 47–48 (4th ed. 2013); see also C.M.A. McCauliff, 
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. 
REV. 1293, 1297 (1982) (quotations omitted) (describing the “clear and convincing” standard as 
what highly probably has happened and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard as what almost 
certainly has happened); Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1, 20 (2010) (ascribing a 71% confidence level to meet the “clear and convincing” standard and 
91% confidence level to meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard). 
73 See Lizette Alvarez, Zimmerman Forgoes Pretrial Hearing, Taking Issue of Immunity to a Jury, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/george-zimmerman-waives-right-
to-pretrial-hearing.html; Erik Waxler, Michael Drejka Will Not Use Stand Your Ground as Defense at 
Trial, Opting for Jury Decision, ABC ACTION NEWS (June 7, 2019, 4:57 PM), 
https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/region-pinellas/michael-drejka-will-not-use-stand-your-ground-
as-defense-at-trial-opting-for-jury-decision. 
74 Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added). 
75 Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. 2008) (“Generally, the Legislature is empowered to 
enact substantive law while [the Court] has the authority to enact procedural law.”). Moreover, an 
argument that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it is a mix of procedure and substance 
may fail, considering that “where a statute contains some procedural aspects, but those provisions are so 
intimately intertwined with the substantive rights created by the statute, that statute will not impermissibly 
intrude on the practice and procedure of the courts in a constitutional sense, causing a constitutional 
challenge to fail.” Id. at 937. 
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D. Much Ado About Nothing 
The unending focus on stand your ground’s lack of an affirmative duty 
to retreat and the pre-trial immunity hearing is a grave mistake if critics of 
stand your ground want to make a change in Florida law. Neither statute is 
illogical nor unconstitutional. Florida’s stand your ground statute makes two 
things clear: (1) a person’s right to use deadly force against another arises at 
the moment of a prior, uninvited, and unlawful imminent threat of deadly 
force of serious bodily injury—and only at that moment—and (2) a subjective 
fear of such force is not enough to trigger the right or the subsequent 
immunity—it must also be objectively reasonable. Moreover, the State, as the 
party seeking to overcome the immunity granted by the Florida Legislature, 
has but one small hurdle to overcome before a single judge—an aspect that 
none of the amendment’s critics seem to acknowledge.  
If prosecutors, defenders, defendants, victims, and Floridians want to 
make a change, they must face some realities about the state of the Florida 
Legislature. Less than two years ago, the Florida Senate attempted to place 
the pre-trial immunity hearing burden on the State. Importantly, in the 
working stages of the amendment, the Senate did not initially seek to burden 
prosecutors with a clear and convincing standard. Rather, the Senate sought 
to burden the State with a beyond a reasonable doubt standard—a 
substantially higher burden to meet.76  
Clearly, the Florida Legislature—despite Floridians’ passionate protests 
and the pervasive blatant disregard for the lives of black males displayed by 
wannabe vigilantes—still supports stand your ground and is willing to do all 
it can to keep it alive and well. So, if the proposed change to Florida law is 
going to be ahead of the culture in which it was born, it needs to be aligned 
with the assurance that it will be supported and enacted. Therefore, 
considering the realities of the state of the law, stand your ground must be 
impacted at the end of the process, rather than at its start. Jury instructions is 
where change must be made and where change will be felt. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Because the main inquiry in a self-defense case is whether the defendant 
felt he truly needed to use deadly force in order to defend himself (and in 
turn, whether the reasonable man would have also feared the victim and used 
 
76 See Bill Analysis Statement, supra note 63, at 1 (seeking to place the burden on the State to 
disprove the self-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt at the pre-trial immunity hearing); Kristen M. 
Clark, Senate’s Changes to Stand Your Ground Ready for Floor Vote Next Month, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 
9, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-
politics/article131715629.html (explaining that the original proposal placed a beyond a reasonable doubt 
burden on the State); see infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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deadly force against him), jurors should be able to consider all of the details 
that the defendant was aware of—either by way of knowledge gained before 
the altercation or by visual inspection at the time of the altercation—at the 
time he used deadly force. For example, jurors should be able to consider the 
physical movements of the victim,77 the presence of threats or weapons,78 and 
the location of the incident.79 Jurors may also consider “any relevant 
knowledge” that the defendant had about the victim, such as whether he was 
under the influence of drugs80 or whether the victim had a reputation for 
violence,81 which may instill a reasonable fear that the victim was 
dangerous. Finally, jurors may consider the “physical attributes of all persons 
involved, including the defendant.”82  
The point of taking these factors into consideration during deliberation 
is so that jurors will be able to determine whether, if placed in the defendant’s 
position, they would have also feared the victim and used deadly force 
against them in an act of self-defense. If the jurors find that they would have 
also used deadly force, then they should find that the defendant was justified. 
If they would not have used deadly force, then they should find that the 
 
77 See, e.g., Jackson v. Edwards, 404 F.3d 612, 624 (2d Cir. 2005) (justification charge warranted 
where defendant shot unarmed but heavily intoxicated man who had allegedly pushed and punched 
him); Davis v. Strack, 270 F.3d 111, 119–20, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (justification charge warranted where 
defendant shot man who had attacked him on previous occasions after the man moved his hand toward 
his waist and started to turn toward defendant); People v. Ligouri, 31 N.E.2d 37, 41 (N.Y. 1940) (victim 
unexpectedly pulled out a gun and snapped it on the defendant). 
78 Commonwealth v. Vidito, 487 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (victim had the defendant 
in a life-threatening chokehold). 
79 Id.; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shafer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Mass. 1975) (self-defense charge 
not warranted where evidence showed that the defendant could have left the basement with her children, 
thus avoiding the use of deadly force). 
80 See, e.g., People v. Frazier, 776 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296 (N.Y. 2004) (“[Whether] the victim had 
ingested [Angel Dust] before the altercation . . . was relevant on the issue of whether it was objectively 
reasonable for [the] defendant to perceive him as dangerous.”); People v. Chevalier, 220 A.D.2d 114, 117 
(N.Y. 1996) (“Since [the victim’s] recent [use of alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine] was a potentially 
powerful objective causal factor of his purportedly ‘crazy’ conduct, and since a person under the influence 
of both alcohol and drugs might well be perceived—even by an observer unaware of the cause of the 
conduct—as acting more dangerously than one who had merely been drinking, the evidence of [the 
victim’s] drug use was admissible and relevant to the justification defense.”). 
81 See, e.g., Davis, 270 F.3d at 129–30 (“Davis knew that Bubblegum, a six-foot tall, 435-pound 
felon, had robbed, raped, and beaten other people at gun point. Bubblegum had robbed Davis at gun point 
three times, forced him to strip naked twice, raped him once, once urged his co-assailant to shoot Davis, 
and at their last meeting, after raping him, promised to kill Davis when he next saw him. This was that 
next meeting.”); People v. Stallworth, 364 Mich. 528, 537 (1961) (holding that evidence of the victim’s 
reputation for “quarrelsomeness, ferocity, brutality, and vindictiveness while . . . intoxicated” was relevant 
in determining whether the defendant believed that an impending attack by the victim required the use of 
deadly force). 
82 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986); see, e.g., ZIMMERMAN V. STATE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, available at 
https://media.cmgdigital.com/shared/news/documents/2013/07/12/jury_instructions_1.pdf (“In 
considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and 
capacities of George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin.”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
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defendant may not avail himself of self-defense immunity. Therefore, it is 
not surprising, nor is it problematic, that jurors should be able to consider 
both the defendant and victim’s physical characteristics in making their 
reasonableness determination.  
However, courts rarely address whether race is an appropriate physical 
characteristic to consider in making their reasonableness determination and 
often leave race out of the conversation, altogether. Rather than acknowledge 
the elephant in the room, courts sweep it under the rug—ignoring both the 
realities of white shooters’ outward prejudices and jurors’ subconscious ones. 
A. Subconscious Bias 
“Many influences condition and direct our reactions to the world even 
when we are not aware of them. Racism, in particular, operates largely in the 
realm of the unconscious.”83 An unfortunate dilemma that American society 
faces (both historically and presently) is the “well-documented and nearly 
universal tendency of Americans to have unconscious patterns of bias against 
African Americans in general and black males in particular, as well as the 
psychosocial and sociological costs that these patterns exact on black 
males.”84  
In 2011, the Opportunity Agenda published a social science literature 
review focusing on “the question of how media, and communications more 
broadly, affect outcomes for black men and boys in American society.”85 
Their review compiled dozens of studies that revealed broad patterns in 
television, advertising, and video games, including overall 
underrepresentation,86 an exaggeration of negative associations,87 a limited 
 
83 Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and 
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 811 (1994); see also Elizabeth Elkin, et al., What You 
Need to Know About ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws, CNN (July 29, 2018, 12:03 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/29/us/stand-your-ground-law-explainer-trnd/index.html (“Even 
those who do not consciously harbor negative associations between race and criminality are regularly 
infected by unconscious views that equate race with violence.”). 
84 OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, SOCIAL SCIENCE LITERATURE REVIEW: MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS 
AND IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF BLACK MEN AND BOYS 1, 20 (2011), 
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/Media-Impact-onLives-of-Black-Men-and-Boys-
OppAgenda.pdf. 
85 Id. at 13. 
86 “In a 1997 sample of network news clips, black speakers accounted for less than” 3% of the 
experts called on to comment on various issues. Id. at 23 (citations omitted). 
87 Particularly criminality and poverty. In a 1993–1994 sample of network news clips, stories 
about black criminals were four times more likely to include mug shots than stories about white criminals. 
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
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representation of positive associations,88 and a general lack of context which 
ignores “historical antecedents of black economic disadvantage and 
persistence of anti-black male bias.”89 Of the various forms of media that 
researchers in this field explore, crime reporting is perhaps the most 
important form of media to discuss within the theoretical framework of racial 
equality for several reasons: 
[C]rime reporting is seen as a direct reflection of a 
community’s health and functioning, which is universally 
relevant to any person who resides in that community; 
content of crime reporting has a direct influence on the 
audience’s perception of personal identity and perception of 
other race members; and the influence of media habitually 
depicting members of a race within a given context 
determines how members of an audience think about that 
behavior itself, namely crime. If it truly is the case that Black 
people are depicted the most in crime reporting over any 
other race, then it would follow that audience members will 
proceed to associate crime with Black people, and a 
problematic perception of that race will develop.90 
Consistent patterns in portrayals of black males as criminal and violent 
can be expected to, and undoubtedly do, promote exaggerated views of 
criminality and violence. For example, the Opportunity Agenda cites to 
studies which show that the “amygdala, a brain region associated with 
experiencing fear, tends to be active when whites view an unfamiliar black 
male face (regardless of their conscious reports about racial attitudes).”91 
Studies that involved game-like simulations have shown that white persons 
are more likely to shoot an unarmed black male than an unarmed white 
male.92 Word-association studies confirm that whites tend to more easily 
associate positive words (e.g., peace, joy, and friend) with unknown white 
faces and negative words (e.g., failure, evil, and war) with unknown black 
faces.93 One study revealed that an act (specifically, an ambiguous shove) 
 
88 Black males are highly associated with physicality and physical achievement in a culture that 
values “machismo,” but at the expense of being absent from important roles such as being emotionally 
intelligent or financially successful. Id. at 24–25 (citations omitted). 
89 Id. at 13–14. 
90 Kassia E. Kulaszewicz, Racism and the Media: A Textual Analysis 12 (2015) (unpublished 
clinical research paper) (on file with St. Catherine University), 
https://sophia.stkate.edu/msw_papers/477/; see also Entman & Gross, supra note 11, at 103 (describing 
how media coverage that overrepresents black persons as criminals develops a “‘crime script’ in which 
crime is violent and perpetrators are black[]”). 
91 OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 84, at 30 (citations omitted). 
92 Id. at 32 (citations omitted). 
93 Id. at 31 (citations omitted). 
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was interpreted as more violent when performed by a black person than a 
white person.94 Another study found that over 56% of Americans consciously 
believe that black persons tend to be prone to violence.95  
The true misfortune of the results of these studies is the fact that black 
persons are not any more prone to violence than any other race. In the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s 2016 report on annual arrests, the Bureau reported 
that 241,063 arrests were made of white persons committing violent crimes, 
whereas 153,341 arrests were made of black persons for the same crimes.96 
The Bureau also reported that 738,319 arrests were made of white persons 
committing property crimes, whereas 301,958 arrests were made of black 
persons for the same crimes.97  
Despite such undeniable evidence that prejudices against black males 
have no basis in reality, “the media’s ability to construct realities that do not 
necessarily accord with official statistics and other factual data . . . 
exaggerate the actual racial disproportion[,]”98 which in turn leads to 
considerable costs at the expense of black males in ways that transcend 
harmless simulations and word-association experiments: 
Biased interpretation can have substantial real-world 
consequences. Consider a teacher whose schema inclines her 
to set lower expectations for some students, creating a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Or a grade school teacher who must 
decide who started the fight during recess. Or a jury who 
must decide a similar question, including the reasonableness 
of force and self-defense.99 
“A large and compelling body of social science research—including 
case studies, studies of conviction rates, death penalty statistics, laboratory 
findings in mock jury studies, and general research on racial prejudice—
 
94 B.L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the 
Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 590 (1976). 
95 Armour, supra note 83, at 787. 
96 Violent crimes are offenses of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault. FBI, 2016 Crime in the United States, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-
in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-21 (last visited Apr. 6, 2019). 
97 Property crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Id. 
98 ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA 
AND RACE IN AMERICA 79 (2000). 
99 OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 84, at 31 (citations omitted); see also Franklin D. Gilliam, 
Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 560 (2000) (finding that exposure to images of black, male, criminal defendants 
increased whites’ punitive attitudes toward crime, as opposed to supporting preventative policies); Joe 
Soss et al., Why Do White Americans Support the Death Penalty?, 65 J. POL. 397, 409 (2003) (finding 
that, in the presence of large populations of black persons, whites’ racial antagonism is particularly 
associated with high support of the death penalty). 
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establishes that racial bias affects jury deliberations.”100 The manner in which 
racial stereotypes infects the reasonableness determination is simple to 
understand: if the victim belongs to a racial group whose members are 
perceived as dangerous, violent, or criminal, jurors may perceive the victim’s 
ambiguous actions as more dangerous, violent, or criminal than they actually 
are.101 In fact, one study “determined that race was the most significant factor 
that determined whether a self-defense incident would be labeled as 
justified.”102 Even more alarming, “[a] larger national study found that in 
cases where whites killed blacks, the killing was 281 percent more likely to 
be labeled as justified.”103 
In an attempt to reduce bias in cases at which race is a core issue or 
avoid overly sensationalized case themes that appeal to the public eye, courts 
often ban references to race during trial. However well-intentioned such an 
instruction may be, it proves more harmful than not. Rather than pretending 
race did not play a role in the confrontation, jurors should be consistently 
reminded that Defendant X is white, and Victim was black because those 
facts alone may reveal some truth about Defendant X’s fear and use of deadly 
force. More importantly, trials which apply a color-blind approach bring to 
light deep-seated racial prejudice among those jurors that are low in explicit 
racism but high in implicit racism.104 If race is made prominent in the 
courtroom, white jurors will typically suppress their negative biases in an 
attempt to appear egalitarian, politically correct, and above all the bias that 
pervades the rest of society.105 Conversely, if race plays only an implicit role 
in the courtroom, but is still the elephant in the courtroom, white jurors’ 
implicit biases will feel free to infect their decision-making.106 In the context 
of trials in which the jurors are white and the defendant is black, Professors 
Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth describe the harm that stems 
from the relationship between color-blind trials and subconscious bias: 
Today, [] many Whites embrace an egalitarian value system 
and a desire to appear nonprejudiced. As a result, salient 
racial issues in a trial are likely to remind White jurors that 
they should avoid prejudice, and these jurors will adjust their 
 
100 Armour, supra note 83, at 795. 
101 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of 
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 423 (1996). 
102 ABA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 2 n.4. 
103 Id. 
104 Elizabeth Ingriselli, Mitigating Jurors’ Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and Timing of 
Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1695–96 (2014). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1696 (“It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white 
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict 
of guilt or innocence.”); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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judgment of Black defendants accordingly. But, when race 
is not salient in a trial, contemporary norms of egalitarianism 
are not necessarily triggered. In these cases, Whites will be 
more likely to render judgment tainted by the racial 
stereotypes and prejudice that linger in the consciousness of 
even the least overtly prejudiced of individuals.107 
Whether or not white jurors truly are as fair and impartial as they make 
themselves out to be, removing race from the conversation during trial—the 
State’s case-in-chief, the defendants’, and the State’s rebuttal—is not the 
proper approach to battling the subconscious bias that so severely impairs 
jurors’ judgment.108  
B. The Failure of the Color-Blind Approach109 
Consider in this regard two of the most controversial self-defense cases 
in recent American history: People v. Goetz and State v. Zimmerman. Both 
trials involved the shooting of black teenagers. Both trials resulted in 
acquittals. Neither trial mentioned race.  
On a New York City subway train in 1984, Bernhard Goetz shot and 
wounded Barry Allen, Troy Canty, Darrell Cabey, James Ramseur—four 
black teenagers—after they approached him and asked for five dollars.110 At 
his trial, Goetz, later dubbed the “Subway Vigilante,” claimed that a 
reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that deadly 
force was necessary to prevent the threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury that the teenagers posed, given his prior experience as a mugging 
 
107 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice 
Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 203 (2001). 
108 Professors Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth suggest that attorneys defending 
black defendants should “play the race card” in order to avoid the perils of a color-blind trial: 
An attorney defending a Black defendant might be wise to intentionally introduce racial issues 
during a trial’s proceedings, during the examination of witnesses, or during opening or closing 
statements. An attorney might suggest that a Black defendant’s race influenced the allegedly 
criminal incident, the subsequent police investigation, the likelihood of arrest, or the indictment 
decision eventually made by prosecutors. . . . [This tactic] could be an effective way to remind White 
jurors of their egalitarian values and of the possibility of racial bias in the criminal system. 
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 107, at 223. 
109 Eva Paterson, et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st Century: Building upon 
Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1175, 1175 (2008) (“Our politicians and courts laud the progress we have made towards becoming a 
‘color-blind’ society, but in reality, they too often mistake ‘race-blindness’ with ‘racism blindness.’”). 
110 This shooting resulted in recovery for three of the four teenagers, but Darrell Cabey was 
rendered a paraplegic with brain damage and later filed a civil suit against Goetz for $50 million in 
damages. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986); see Jan Hoffman, Goetz II: Race Card, Early 
and Often, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/11/nyregion/goetz-ii-race-
card-early-and-often.html. 
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victim.111 Race did not play a role in Goetz’s argument or in the court’s 
opinion—instead, the case is now a regular addition to first-year criminal law 
casebooks for the proposition that a defendant’s prior experiences as a 
mugging victim should inform the jury’s reasonableness determination.  
Race was conspicuously absent from the trial, as well. Despite the issue 
of race never appearing on paper, during opening statements, or throughout 
cases-in-chief, legal theorists have identified several unquestionable 
instances in which the defense made subliminal appeals to the underlying 
racial aspect of the case.112 The most undeniable illustration of tugging at 
jurors’ subconscious bias about black males was when the defense recreated 
the shooting of the teenagers by calling in four young black Guardian Angels 
to act as the four black victims.113 Professor George Fletcher, who witnessed 
the entire trial, also noted the effects of consistently referring to the four 
victims as “savages,” “vultures,” “the predators’ on society,” and “the ‘gang 
of four’”: 
These verbal attacks signaled a perception of the four youths 
as representing something more than four individuals 
committing an act of aggression against a defendant. That 
“something more” requires extrapolation from their 
characteristics to the class of individuals for which they 
stand. There is no doubt that one of the characteristics that 
figures into this implicit extrapolation is their blackness.114  
James Ramseur, himself, questioned the defense’s tactics when Goetz’s 
lead counsel repeatedly highlighted Ramseur’s criminal record in an attempt 
to “portray him as a thug.”115 Clearly recognizing the defense’s surreptitious 
use of anti-Black bias and “[a]ngered by the questions about his record, Mr. 
Ramseur at one point snapped, ‘Has that got anything to do with him shooting 
me?’”116 In stark distinction to the color-blind criminal trial, 117 Darrell Cabey 
overtly and expertly ‘played the race card’ in his civil suit against Goetz, 
 
111 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 52. 
112 See Armour, supra note 83, at 783 (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: 
BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 206–08 (1988)); see also Cynthia Yung Lee, Race and Self-
Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 422 (1996) 
(describing the same scene). 
113 Armour, supra note 83, at 784. 
114 Id. (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 112, at 206). 
115 Mary Connelly & Carlyle C. Douglas, In Goetz Trial, the Defense Goes on Offense, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 24, 1987), https://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/24/weekinreview/the-region-in-goetz-trial-
the-defense-goes-on-offense.html?searchResultPosition=35. 
116 Id. 
117 In his opening statement, Darrell Cabey’s attorney quoted Goetz as saying: “The only way 
you’re going to clean up these streets is to get rid of spics and niggers.” Adam Nossiter, Race Is Dominant 
Theme As 2d Goetz Trial Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/12/nyregion/race-is-dominant-theme-as-2d-goetz-trial-begins.html. 
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resulting in a $43 million verdict.118 “Reacting testily to a question about 
whether he was playing what has come to be called ‘the race card,’ [Darrell 
Cabey’s attorney] said: ‘The race card in this case was played by Bernhard 
Goetz. He played on the fears of the jury.’”119 
Despite the wide commentary outside the courtroom about Goetz’s race, 
that of the four victims and the obvious racial qualities of the crime, Goetz’s 
trial failed to address that aspect in any meaningfully outright manner.120 
Goetz was eventually sentenced to six months in jail for carrying an 
unlicensed concealed pistol and acquitted of charges of attempted murder and 
assault.121  
With some eerie similarity,122 George Zimmerman fatally shot Trayvon 
Martin, an unarmed black teenager, in a Central Florida neighborhood in 
2012.123 In State v. Zimmerman, like in People v. Goetz, race did not play the 
role that the world outside the courtroom thought it should have.124 In fact, 
the trial judge expressly limited the prosecutors in a pivotal way:  
Prosecutors . . . could argue that Zimmerman “profiled” 
Trayvon Martin as a likely intruder because the self-
appointed neighborhood watchman did not recognize the 
 
118 See John J. Goldman, Jury Orders Goetz to Pay $43 Million for Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 
24, 1996), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-04-24-mn-62154-story.html. 
119 Nossiter, supra note 117. 
120 See also Floyd H. Flake, Blacks Are Fair Game, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/19/opinion/blacks-are-fair-game.html (“I believe that the Goetz 
decision sends the wrong signals to white Americans. It says blacks are fair game. If a white person 
suspects, rightly or wrongly, that a black man may commit a criminal act, then a white person is able to 
take any action he sees fit.”). 
121 Goetz Given 6-Month Term on Gun Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 1987), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/20/nyregion/goetz-given-6-month-term-on-gun-charge.html. 
122 In his opening statement, the prosecutor directly quoted George Zimmerman on his phone call 
to a 911 dispatcher just moments before he shot Trayvon Martin: “Fucking punks. These assholes. They 
always get away.” Croaker Queen, George Zimmerman Trial – Day 1 – Part 1 (Opening Statement), 
YOUTUBE (June 24, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsgtFBN8uKs; see Lizette Alvarez, 
Zimmerman Case Has Race as a Backdrop, but You Won’t Hear It in Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/zimmerman-case-has-race-as-a-backdrop-but-you-wont-hear-
it-in-court.html; Steven Mazie, The Quiet Racism in the Zimmerman Trial, BIG THINK (July 16, 2013), 
https://bigthink.com/praxis/the-quiet-racism-in-the-zimmerman-trial. 
123 See Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-
trayvon-martin.html. 
124 See Alvarez, supra note 122 (“From the very beginning, there was no more powerful theme in 
the fatal shooting of Trayvon Martin than the issue of race. But in the courtroom . . . race lingers 
awkwardly on the sidelines, scarcely mentioned but impossible to ignore.”); Mazie, supra note 122 (“But 
since these racial overtones were banned from the courtroom discourse, the jurors had no opportunity to 
consider them.”). 
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young man [but they] could not argue that Zimmerman 
“racially profiled” Martin.125  
Read that again.  
Prosecutors . . . could argue that Zimmerman “profiled” 
Trayvon Martin as a likely intruder because the self-
appointed neighborhood watchman did not recognize the 
young man [but they] could not argue that Zimmerman 
“racially profiled” Martin.126  
Despite race being the elephant in the courtroom, prosecutors were 
barred from outright stating that race played any role in Zimmerman’s 
decision to use deadly force.127 Not only did the court ignore every protest, 
speech, and criticism that acknowledged the most obvious nature of the 
crime, the court forced both parties and all six jurors to do so, as well. 
Bernhard Goetz, himself, commented, “I’m surprised the same thing is 
happening 30 years later. It’s a different place, but the prosecution is the 
same.”128 The jury eventually found Zimmerman not guilty of second-degree 
murder and acquitted him of manslaughter.129  
Perhaps there did not exist a single juror during either deliberation that 
considered the race of the defendants or the five black teenagers involved.130 
Perhaps every juror failed to consider the quite conceivable idea that the 
defendants truly feared that the teenagers were going to use deadly force 
against them simply because Trayvon Martin, Barry Allen, Troy Canty, 
Darrell Cabey, and James Ramseur were black. However, even in the 
unlikely scenario that race did not play a factor in deciding to acquit Bernhard 
Goetz and George Zimmerman of all charges, no juror should feel as though 
the law allows them to take race into consideration when deciding whether a 
defendant’s fear of the victim was reasonable.131  
 




127 “‘There is no question that race is the 800-pound gorilla in this trial[.]’” Id. 
128 Harry Siegel & Filipa Ioannou, Bernhard Goetz on George Zimmerman: ‘The Same Thing Is 
Happening’, THE DAILY BEAST (July 12, 2013, 4:45 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/bernhard-
goetz-on-george-zimmerman-the-same-thing-is-happening. 
129 Alvarez & Buckley, supra note 123. 
130 Any person at the Zimmerman trial would be hard-pressed to advance this argument. “Trayvon 
Martin’s race, however, could not be completely eliminated from the jury’s consciousness. Jurors needed 
only to look at the autopsy photos of Trayvon Martin or observe his parents in the courtroom to be aware 
of his race.” Cynthia Lee, (E)Racing Trayvon Martin, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 91, 107 (2014). 
131 In 1996, Professor Lee took note of the same critiques made in this comment: 
In the Goetz case, the jury instructions, which did not mention race or racial stereotypes, did not 
reduce the chances that the race of the victims might prejudice the jurors in Goetz’s favor. If the 
jurors were inclined to perceive the actions of the four Black youths as hostile or violent, at least in 
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Fact-finding is a difficult task, even when race is not at issue. Fact-
finding becomes downright impossible when race is at issue but is swept so 
far underneath the rug that prosecutors cannot say the word “racial” if it 
precedes the word “profiling.” Thus, in a society in which our racial 
prejudices are formed without the involvement of individual conscious 
energy, courts must determine the extent of the role of race in the courtroom. 
Courts may either acquiesce to systemic racial prejudice by legitimizing 
verdicts rendered on the basis of implicit racial biases132 or they may apply a 
hardline rule in which “inevitable bias” has no place.  
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
The subconscious racial bias exposed in the previously discussed studies 
reveals the danger in instructing jurors to consider the “physical attributes of 
all persons involved, including the defendant”133 without explicitly excluding 
race. Few Americans are likely to acknowledge the racial animus that they 
embody,134 and even fewer are likely to take the precautions needed to 
operate without it. May the birthplace of racial animus be in 
overrepresentation in news stories about violent crimes or in real-life 
interaction with black persons, such animus (a) is typically subconsciously 
activated and inadvertently present, and (b) does not get left behind outside 
of the courthouse doors.135 Ultimately, when the reasonableness 
 
part because the youths were Black, they were allowed to rely on these stereotype-driven feelings. 
If the jurors were inclined to empathize more with Goetz than his victims because of racial affinity, 
the jury instructions did nothing to discourage such racially selective empathy. 
Lee, supra note 101, at 423. 
132 Professor Jody D. Armour aptly summarized the effect of condoning such a conclusion on 
future trials: 
[G]ranting legal recognition to [self-defense claims based on a fear of black men] communicates the 
state’s approval of racial bias regardless of what theory she pursues; it sends the message that “your 
dread of blacks is a valid excuse for taking the life of an innocent black person.” In conveying such 
messages, the court reinforces derogatory cultural stereotypes and stigmatizes all Americans of 
African descent. 
Armour, supra note 83, at 815. 
133 People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114 (N.Y. 1986); see also ZIMMERMAN V. STATE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 82 (“In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the 
relative physical abilities and capacities of George Zimmerman and Trayvon Martin.”). 
134 A juror is not likely to admit being a prejudiced person, against African-Americans or Asian-
Americans or Hispanics, as the case may be, and indeed might not recognize the extent to which 
unconscious racial stereotypes might affect his or her evaluation of a defendant of a different race, 
or of the witnesses produced on that defendant’s behalf. 
State v. Tucker, 629 A.2d 1067, 1077–78 (Conn. 1993). 
135 “The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is a courtroom, be he any color of the 
rainbow, but people have a way of carrying their resentments right into a jury box.” HARPER LEE, TO KILL 
A MOCKINGBIRD 220 (1960). 
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determination comes down to the costs of waiting before using deadly force 
and not waiting to use deadly force, evidence of race becomes a major player.  
The justice system, which seeks “both to accommodate the behavior of 
ordinary persons and to encourage desirable behavior,” should err on the side 
of “formulating rules that prevent the stigmatization of blacks, reflect the 
community’s moral aspirations of racial equality, and help eradicate racial 
discrimination.”136 In an effort to do so, courts should begin by instructing 
jurors that race is not a factor that may be taken into consideration when 
determining whether a defendant’s fear of the victim was reasonable. Jurors 
may not conclude that Defendant X, a white male, was reasonable in his 
belief that Victim, a black male, was going to use deadly force against him 
because, among other factors, Victim was black.  
Florida’s current model jury instructions for the justifiable use of deadly 
force state: “In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into 
account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and 
(victim).”137 One possible reform of model jury instructions would be to offer 
a limiting instruction addressing the impropriety of relying on stereotypes. 
Such an instruction may include the following language: 
In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into 
account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the 
defendant and victim. However, you should not make 
assumptions about the defendant or victim based on their 
race or ethnicity. Assumptions about a party’s race or 
ethnicity do not have a basis in the evidence before you. 
Therefore, those assumptions should not factor into your 
determination about whether the defendant’s use of deadly 
force was reasonable. If you find that your evaluation of the 
case is affected by a subconscious reliance on stereotypes, 
you must attempt to reevaluate the case from a neutral 
perspective.138  
Other acceptable forms include instructions that stress the importance 
of not relying on biases,139 or more explicit instructions that list all proper 
 
136 Armour, supra note 83, at 815–16. 
137 FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 3.6(F): JUSTIFIABLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, 
https://jury.flcourts.org/criminal-jury-instructions-home/criminal-jury-instructions/sji-criminal-chapter-
3/. 
138 See Lee, supra note 101, at 481–83 (proposing a similar supplemental limiting instruction, 
including language that suggests to jurors to engage in a race-switching exercise in order to determine 
whether they are making unfair assessments based on racial stereotypes). 
139 See, e.g., MD. STATE BAR ASS’N, MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2:04 
(2nd ed. 2018); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.102 (4th ed. rev. 
2008); CALIFORNIA FORMS OF JURY INSTRUCTION § 113 (Matthew Bender and Co. ed. 2019) (1985). 
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considerations (height, weight, etc.)—while strictly excluding race.140 Judge 
Mark W. Bennett of the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Iowa goes a step further than most model jury instructions:  
Do not decide the case based on “implicit biases.” As we 
discussed in jury selection, everyone, including me, has 
feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, 
that is, “implicit biases,” that we may not be aware of. These 
hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear, how we 
remember what we see and hear, and how we make 
important decisions. Because you are making very important 
decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to evaluate 
the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to conclusions 
based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut 
feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The 
law demands that you return a just verdict, based solely on 
the evidence, your individual evaluation of that evidence, 
your reason and common sense, and these instructions. Our 
system of justice is counting on you to render a fair decision 
based on the evidence, not on biases.141 
Recommendations to mend jury instructions never come without their 
fair share of criticisms: jurors are hopelessly confused by jury instructions,142 
raising race as an issue right at the end of a trial will only remind jurors that 
it exists,143 and jury instructions about racial prejudice make little, if any, 
impression on jurors who operate with it subconsciously.144 As powerfully 
supported as the criticisms may be, if jury instructions were truly useless, 
courts would stop using them altogether. The better approach is to deal head 
on with the elephant in the courtroom rather than pretend it does not exist. 
 
140 “When assessing the reasonableness of [Defendant]’s fear, you may consider the individual 
characteristics of [Defendant] and [Victim], such as their respective size, gender, age, physical condition, 
strength, stamina, courage, and assertiveness.” VT. BAR ASS’N, VERMONT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTION CR07-111, SELF-DEFENSE (USE OF DEADLY FORCE) (2019), 
http://www.vtjuryinstructions.org/criminal/MS07-111.htm. 
141 Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 827, 859 (2012). 
142 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1793 
(1993) (“Instructions, however, would be unlikely to provide much of a shield against racial imagery, 
even were judges more inclined to give them. The limited research from mock juries indicates that jurors 
often do not attend to, or are confused by, jury instructions.”). 
143 Id. (“Even more discouraging is the possibility that judicial references to race may serve to 
recall and emphasize a racial image presented earlier in the trial[.]”). 
144 Id. (“Moreover, jury instructions assume that the influence of racial imagery on deliberations 
is conscious; even if instructions inhibit jurors from speaking in explicitly racial terms, they are unlikely 
to be very effective in erasing previously introduced racial imagery.”). 
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Without a jury instruction that explicitly forbids race from the 
reasonableness determination, courts are no longer abiding by the 
“reasonable man” standard; rather, courts are holding defendants to the 
“reasonable racist”145 standard. Even if a mountain of empirical sociological 
evidence reveals that every single person in society is guilty of racial 
prejudice, such prejudice is improper, and it is even more improper for courts 
to condone it. To turn a blind eye to racial bias is to turn a blind eye to our 
aspirations of blind justice. Thus, the court’s duty is to adopt jury instructions 
which forbid jurors from contemplating a defendant or victim’s race as a 
factor that plays into the reasonableness determination because to fail to do 
so would be to actively endorse racial prejudice. 
 
 
145 Professor Jody D. Amour explains who the “reasonable racist” is and what his views are: 
The Reasonable Racist asserts that, even if his belief that blacks are “prone to violence” stems from 
pure prejudice, he should be excused for considering the victim’s race before using force because 
most similarly situated Americans would have done so as well. For inasmuch as the criminal justice 
system operates on the assumption that “blame is reserved for the (statistically) deviant,” an 
individual racist in a racist society cannot be condemned for an expression of human frailty as 
ubiquitous as racism. 
Armour, supra note 83, at 787. But see Lee, supra note 101, at 459 (“The problem with The Reasonable 
Racist’s claim is that a ‘typical’ belief is not necessarily a ‘reasonable’ belief. Just because most or many 
people share the same bias does not mean that the shared bias is a reasonable bias. The average person is 
not necessarily reasonable.”). 
